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Letters Rogatory: Current Problems Facing
International Judicial Assistance
The litigant whose cause of action involves persons or events in another country often must produce in his nation's courts either testimony
of a non-resident witness or documentary evidence located abroad, serve
judicial documents on nonresidents or obtain information on foreign
law.' The cooperation and aid of another nation's legal system in these
situations can be invaluable and even essential. This aid rendered by
one nation to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings in another country's
tribunals is called international judicial assistance. 2 Largely because of
the dramatic differences between the procedural norms and theoretical
bases on which the legal systems of different nations operate, 3 requests
for aid and cooperation are not always honored. What might be called
"judicial ethnocentrism," Le., the reluctance of judges to aid legal sys5
tems not resembling their own, 4 and concerns of national sovereignty
have motivated judges to
international judicial assistance. In
some cases, the decision as frustrate
to the granting of assistance can significantly
affect the economic positions and even certain foreign and domestic policies of the respective nations. While it can simply involve a mechancal
application of previously agreed upon procedures, international judicial
assistance must often resolve greater issues.
In the past thirty years great strides have been made in the use of
international judicial assistance. This note will examine three recent
cases in order to analyze the current state of one specific area of international judicial assistance, letters rogatory. An American case, In re Letters
Rogatog From Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan,6 follows the general trend to1 Jones, International JudicialAssistance." Procedural

Chaos and a Programfor Reform, 62 YALE

L.J. 515, 516 (1953).
2 Id at 517.
3 Miller, InternationalCooperation in Litigation Between the UnitedStates and Switzerland: Unilateral ProceduralAccommodation in a Test Tuhe, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1069, 1072 (1965).

4 Recent Development, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 106, 109 (1977).
5 The cult [of national sovereignty] has become mankind's major religion. The
intensity of worship of the idol of the national state is, of course, no evidence that
national sovereignty provides a satisfactory basis for the political organization of
mankind . . . . The truth is the very opposite . . . . It seems fairly safe to fore-

cast that, if the human race survives, it will have abandoned the ideal and practice of national sovereignty.
Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sooereignty: A Skeptic's Analysis, 3 LAW & POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 1 (1971) (quoting A. Toynbee, THE RELUCTANT DEATH OF SOVEREIGNTY).
6 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ward liberalizing the letters rogatory procedures in favor of objectivity
and international order. Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation, a British case, 7 and Re Westinghouse Electric Corporationand
Duquesne Light Company, et a. ,8 a Canadian case, illustrate the difficulties
encountered even by today's liberalized procedures for letters rogatory
when economic and national policy issues are emphasized. Before discussing the approaches taken in those cases a brief analysis of the function and evolution of letters rogatory is in order.
The basic problem which letters rogatory are designed to remedy
has been described as follows:
Since a majority of the states and foreign countries follow the territorial
concept of sovereignty as the principal basis for furnishing jurisdiction
over a person, problems frequently arise involving the testimony of absent or non-resident witnesses. Often, the forum does not require the
witness' physical presence, but only his testimony. This power to procure testimony from an absent or non-resident witness is fundamentally
ajudicial power of any sovereign and is restricted by a sovereign's territorial boundaries. In the absence of a treaty, convention, statute, or judicial authorization, a state may not send a representative outside of the
state and into another state or country and there permit him to exercise

his power to compel the absent or non-resident witness to testify. This
interfere with the sovereignty of the sister state or foreign
would clearly
9
country.

What techniques then exist to assist persons in obtaining evidence in a
foreign country needed for the vindication of their rights in the courts of
their home country? In U.S. law there are a number of such techniques,
including direct subpoena of the evidence by the domestic courts
(F.R.C.P. 26),10 desposition on notice and deposition on commission, as
provided by F.R.C.P. 28(b). I I The most expensive, time-consuming and
12
useful procedure, however, is the use of letters rogatory.
Letters rogatory are,
the medium, in effect, whereby one country,

. . .

acting through its own

courts and by methods of court procedures peculiar thereto and entirely
within the latter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the
former country; such request being made and usually granted, by reason
of the comity existing between nations in ordinary peaceful times.13

When letters rogatory are used, the rules of procedure of the foreign tribunal to which the request for assistance was made control, for a court
cannot execute its own laws in a foreign jurisdiction.' 4 Moreover, this
7 [1978] 1 All. E.R. 434 [hereinafter cited as Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium
Contracts Litigation].
8 78 D.L.R.3d 3.
9 Rafalko, Depositions, Commissions and Letters Rogatog in a Conficts of Law Case, 4 Duo.
U.L. REV. 115 (1965).
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
11 Id 28(b). For a fuller discussion, see Gangel, The Witness Abroad: Unobtainable Evidence,
22 N.Y. INTRA. L.R. 288 (1967); Note, 55 B.U.L. REv. 368 (1975).
12 Note, 46 IOWA L. REV. 619, 630 (1961).
13 Tiedeman v. The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941).
14 Note, 23 IOWA L. REv. 92, 93 (1937).
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foreign tribunal is under no obligation or compulsion to execute the letters rogatory, the decision ultimately resting upon the tribunal's own discretion whether to enforce them or not.' 5 However, comity, as well as
the promise of reciprocity 1 6 contained in each letters rogatory, 17 usually
suffices for its execution,' 8 provided that such execution neither exceeds
the jurisdiction or power of the requested state's judiciary nor interferes
with the requested state's sovereignty nor becomes an oppressive burden
on the resident of the requested state from whom the evidence is
sought. 19
When given the choice, U.S. courts generally favor depositions over
letters rogatory, since under the former the U.S. court procedure is followed and thus the acquired evidence is likely to meet the U.S. court's
requirements for admissability.2 0 However, in some civil law countries
the taking of evidence is regarded as an exclusive function of the sovereign 2 1 and must be performed according to local procedures. Thus, the
fact that depositions can be taken according to a foreign legal system's
procedure constitutes both the reason why the U.S. courts favor depositions and why most civil law countries prohibit their use. 22 Consequently letters rogatory are virtually the only effective procedure for
foreigners to secure the testimony of witnesses in most of continental Europe. 23 In addition, if the witness abroad is unwilling to testify voluntarily, letters rogatory again become the sole means even in common law
countries, since the power to compel testimony often belongs to the sover24
eign alone.
These unique attributes of letters rogatory became increasingly important as the volume of litigation involving international aspects surged
after World War 11.25 The United States in particular, long famous for
its "juridical isolationism,"'26 became active in efforts to improve all as15 Id at 94.

16 A letters rogatory is properly issued by a court of such general jurisdiction that it could
reciprocate the favor granted by the foreign court. Jones, supra note 1, at 532.
17 Revised FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) adopted the singular term "letter rogatory" contrary to
most literature in the field which uses "letters rogatory" for both singular and plural. Professor
James Moore said, "Of letters rogatory and mooses-let us hope those learned draftsmen never
deal with the subject of moose, for by their logic two moose must surely be two mooses." 4
28.05, at 1929 (2d ed. 1976).
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
18 Jones, supra note 1,at 532.
19 Note, JuditalCooperation in the Taking of Evidence Abroad--The Canada and Ontario Evidence

Acts, 8 TEx. INT'L L.J. 57, 75 (1973).

See Gangel, supra note 11, at 294.
Id at 295.
22 "It is the 'inquisitorial' nature of the civil law trial-in sharp contrast to the common
law 'adversary' proceeding-which most severely restricts the usefulness of a letter rogatory
addressed to a civilian court: under civil law, witnesses are examined by the judge, not by
counsel." Jones, supra note 1, at 531.
23 Gangel, supra note 11, at 293.
24 Sklaver, Obtaining Evidence in InternationalLitigation, 7 CUM. L; REv. 233, 235 (1976).
25 See Note, 55 B.U.L. REV. 368, n.l (1975); Jones, supra note 1, at 516.
26 Jones, supra note 1, at 517.
20
21
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pects of international judicial assistance. 27 In 1958, Congress established
the Committee of International Rules of Judicial Procedure to study the
system of international judicial assistance and to recommend improvements.2 8 These efforts resulted in twofold action by the United States:
entry into multilateral negotiations and treaties regarding international
judicial assistance, and unilateral reform of the domestic procedures for
rendering and requesting judicial aid, in the hope that by maximizing
the flexibility
of the U.S. system other states would be encouraged to
29
reciprocate.
One product of the multilateral negotiations was The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters. 30 This convention represents a major advance for letters rogatory procedures. Basically the Convention's procedures attempt to,
bridge the gap between common-law practice, which places upon the
parties to the litigation the duty of privately securing the evidence and
presenting it at trial, and the civil law concept of judicial sovereignty
under which the obtaining of evidence is a matter primarily for the court
with the parties in the subordinate position of assisting the judicial au3
thorities. 1

Under the Convention, letters rogatory are termed "letters of request"
32
and the principal method of securing international judicial assistance.
Each contracting nation is required to designate a central authority to
receive these letters of request from foreign courts and to deliver them to
the appropriate court within the executing state. The Convention also
limits the permissible grounds on which a state may refuse to execute
letters unless it took specific exception at the time of signing. Otherwise,
the receiving nation may refuse to execute the letters only if its form fails
to comply with the Convention requirements, if the execution would require acts beyond the functions of that state's judiciary, or if the execution would be prejudicial to the state's security or sovereignty. Thus,
differing legal systems can interact pursuant to one uniform procedural
mechanism and need no longer rely on "the vague and uncertain duties
''3 3
imposed by international comity.
These recent improvements in international judicial assistance have
been hindered by the strain on international relations caused by the rise
of the multinational corporation. 34 Because of a multinational's presFor a discussion of these efforts see Jones, supra note 1,at 556-62.
Recent Development, supra note 4, at 108.
Miller, supra note 3, at 1072. One such unilateral reform, the 1964 amendment to 28
U.S.C. § 1782, will be discussed below in reference to the Lockheed case.
30 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, March
18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
31 Sklaver, supra note 24, at 242.
32 Note, 55 B.U.L. REV. 368, 381 (1975).
33 Id at 380.
34 "[M]ost (75%) of the world's trade and industrial production will by the 1980's be in the
hands of 300, or so, global corporations." Vagts, The GlobalCorporation andInternational Law, 7 J.
27

28
29

INT'L L. & ECON. 247, 249 (1972) (citing Angelo, MultinationalCorporate Enterprises, 125 RECUEIL
DE COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

443, 575 (1968)).
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ence in more than one nation, international conflict can result from assertions of overlapping jurisdictions. 35 For instance, a host nation,
feeling threatened by this new form of foreign investment, "is likely to
believe that the maintenance of national independence and sovereignty
and its capacity to carry out national policy. . . leave it no other choice
• . . than to regard resident foreign subsidiaries as falling within its jurisdiction. ' '36 But when the multinational corporation involved has significant operations in a number of countries, regulation of the multinational
instigated by one host nation is likely to have some extraterritorial effect.
Indeed, domestic courts may also use the foreign subsidiary to reach the
operations of the foreign parent.3 7 Unilateral action by one nation
against a multinational corporation is therefore often the source of international friction and can be particularly damaging to the advancement
of international judicial cooperation. 38 Not coincidentally, each of the
three cases to be discussed deals with the regulation of a multinational.
The 1976 U.S. case, In Re Letters Rogatoryfrom the Tokyo District, Tokyo,
Japan,39 adopted a liberal approach with regard to letters rogatory in the
regulation of multinationals, the result clearly being influenced by the
egregious nature of Lockheed's activities. In that case, on May 28, 1976
letters rogatory issued by a Japanese district court judge, requesting immediate assistance in taking in camera depositions, were presented to the
U.S. district court for the Central District of California where the deponent resided. The letters rogatory were issued pursuant to a request by
the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office in aid of an investigation of
alleged improper payments of money by officers and agents of Lockheed,
a U.S. corporation, to Japanese citizens. 40 The U.S. witnesses whose
depositions were sought by the letters rogatory were not the subjects of
the investigation.
On June 15, 1976, the U.S. district court issued a stay to block the
taking of the depositions, and the U.S. district attorney, appointed by the
district court to preside over the depositions, filed a motion to terminate
the stay. This motion was granted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, which resolved the issue of whether the letters rogatory in
this case were issued to obtain testimony for use in a foreign "tribunal" as
35 Hollmann, Problems of Obtaining Evidence in Antitrust Litigation: ComparativeApproaches to the
Aultinational Corporation, 11 TEX. INT'L L.J. 461, 462 (1976). Some writers have expressed the
problems in fundamental terms: "Reduced to its simplest terms there is an inherent conflict
between the objectives of the international corporation and the nation-state." Goldberg & Kindleberger, Toward a GA rrfor Investment.- A ProposalforSupervision of the InternationalCorporation, 2
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 295, 296 (1970).
36 J. BEHRMAN, NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 9 (1970).

37 Hollmann, supra note 35, at 463.
38 Note, supra note 19, at 57.
39 539 F.2d 1216.
40 Japan and the United States had entered a mutual assistance agreement entitled: 'Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in Connection with the Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation Matter," and a copy accompanied the letters rogatory. Id at 1217.
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that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1782.41 Priorjudicial interpretations of
section 1782 had indicated that the requesting foreign "tribunal" must
be acting as an adjudicatory body capable of resolving controversies for
the request to be granted. 42 A third circuit case cited by the Tokyo court,
In re Letters Request to Examine Witnesses From the Court of the Queens Benchfor
Manitoba, Canada,43 affirmed a district court ruling that "section 1782
was not intended to and does not authorize the United States courts to
compel testimony on behalf of foreign government bodies whose purpose
is to conduct investigations unrelated to judicial or quasi-judicial contro44
versies."
The Tokyo court noted, however, that the previous language of section 1782, replaced by the 1964 amendment, had been more limiting.
The words "any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign
country" were replaced with "a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal. '45 The Tokyo court reasoned that Congress intended to
broaden the prior law and permit extension of international judicial
assistance to bodies of quasi-judicial or administrative nature. 46 Therefore, since the Tokyo public prosecutor was empowered to make the final
decision to prosecute, his investigation was sufficiently related to "judicial or quasi-judicial controversies." Manitoba was distinguished on the
ground that the investigatory entity requesting assistance in that case
47
was empowered only to make recommendations to a non-judicial body.
By de-emphasizing the character of the foreign body seeking assistance,
this decision clearly accommodated the congressional intent to broaden
the scope of international judicial assistance through unilateral procedu48
ral reform.
The British and Canadian cases, on the other hand, do not reflect
the liberality exhibited in the Tokyo case. Significantly, those countries
face two factors not before the U.S. courts with respect to letters rogatory: (1) the United States' unique method for determining the extent of
its own jurisdiction, and, (2) the United States' unusual rules of discov41 Section 1782(a) reads as follows:
The distict court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order
him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing
for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may be
made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or inter-

national tribunal or upon the application of any interested person .
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1966).
42 In re Letters Rogatory Issued by the Director of Inspections of the Government of India, 385 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1967).
43 488 F.2d. 511 (9th Cir.), afg 59 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
44 59 F.R.D. 625, 627 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
45 539 F.2d at 1218.
46 The Tokyo court cited the House Reports: "The word 'tribunal' is used to make it clear
that assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts." Id. (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3782,

3788).
47 539 F.2d at 1219.
48 Recent Development, supra note 4, at 109.
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cry. For purposes of determining jurisdiction, many nations apply the
objective test of territoriality. 49 However, U.S. courts adhere to the "effects doctrine" as first stated in

United States v. 41uminum Co. of America

(Alcoa).50 This doctrine permits a state to "impose liabilities, even upon
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends."' 5' It is often
contended that this assertion of jurisdiction beyond national boundaries
violates the sovereignties of other nations and contravenes international

law. 5 2 The dilemma for U.S. courts is whether to enforce their own laws
effectively through the use of the effects doctrine, or to follow a policy of
judicial non-interference in areas that have significant impact on U.S.
foreign relations, on the theory that the conduct of foreign relations is
reserved for the executive and legislative branches. 5 3

The latter ap-

proach requires the courts to respect the laws of other sovereign states
"even though they may differ in economic and legal philosophy from our
own." 54 United States courts have demonstrated little hesitancy in
resolving this dilemma. As one writer has observed:
No other nation [aside from the United States) has expanded the geographic scope of its domestic legislation, especially in antitrust and shipping, to the point of exercising some degree of regulatory control over
the economic activities of other countries within those countries. No
other nation has been able to assert successfully
the right to enforce its
55
legal process outside its own territory.

England, and especially Canada, have been major victims of the extra49 Maechling, Uncle Sam's Long Arm, 63 A.B.AJ. 373 (1977).
50 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
51 Id. at 443.

52 As one Canadian official declared:
What we are concerned about is the possible effect of the decree asked for in the
United States so far as it may require directors of Canadian companies to take
certain actions with respect to the operation of those companies in Canada, which
actions would not be dictated by the requirements of Canadian law, or be in
accord with Canadian business or commercial policy, but would be dictated by
requirements of United States law and be in accord with United States policy.
H.C. DEB. (Can.), 1959, Vol. I, at 618, as quoted in Note, supra note 19, at 66.
53 Backer, Sherman ActJurirdictionand the Acts of ForeignSovereigns, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1247
(1977).
54 Note, Discovery ofDocuments LocatedAbroadin US.Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in
the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 752
(1974), (citing Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962); for one
solution, see Comment, "Be No Longer A Chaos" Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's
Extraterritorial
JurisdictionalScope, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 733 (1977).

55 Maechling, supra note 49, at 373. Of course, the EEC has asserted the application of its
antitrust provisions beyond its boundaries. Maechling adds:
A jurisdictional dispute in a particular case theoretically is supposed to be settled
according to the principle of comity, whereby the parties make an objective judgment as to which state has the paramount interest and then defer to it. But comity is effective as an arbiter only if all parties concerned, especially governments,
show respect for the reserved domain of other states and exercise judicial restraint. These qualities have been notably deficient in American courts and regulatory agencies for the last few decades.
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territorial application of U.S. law. 56
While other countries object to this extraterritorial extension of substantive U.S. law, they also object to the extraterritorial extension of U.S.
procedural law in the form of broad discovery. 57 Foreign nations argue
that national sovereignty requires that persons residing in a state not be
forced to submit to a broader form of inquiry with regard to an action
pending in a foreign court than they would be forced to undergo if the
litigation were being conducted in the state, regardless of considerations
of international cooperation and comity, the importance of the evidence,
and the burden on the witness. 58 Illustrative of this point of view was the
case of Radio Corporationof America v. Rauland,59 a 1956 British case which
was also adopted as binding in Canada.60 In this case, the British court
refused to execute letters rogatory issued by a U.S. court that requested,
in keeping with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, evidence that
though itself inadmissable at trial might have led to other evidence that
would have been admissable. Speaking for the court, Lord Goddard
termed such a procedure a "fishing proceeding, which is never allowed in
'6
English courts." '
The British and Canadian cases exemplify the jurisdiction and discovery objections examined above. Both cases had their origins in the
Westinghouse Electric Corporation uranium contracts litigation begun
in 1975 by sixteen U.S. public utility companies. 62 Briefly stated, Westinghouse entered into contracts to supply uranium to these companies for
specified periods at essentially a fixed base price subject only to an escalation clause to meet increases in the general cost of living. But after 1973,
the price of uranium increased from six to forty-one dollars per pound.
Note, supra note 19, at 60-67.
57 Foreign countries also object when U.S. courts, after finding jurisdiction over foreign
corporations or individuals through use of the various "long-arm" statutes, issue discovery orders directly to the foreign party. To combat this alleged invasion of their sovereignty, many
countries have passed laws with criminal penalties which prohibit the removal or disclosure of
56

certain documents. In Societi Internationalpour ParticipationsIndustrielleelCommerciales, SA. v. Rog-

ers (357 U.S. 197 [1958]) the U.S. Supreme Court responded by holding that foreign illegality is
not necessarily a valid excuse for non-production of court-ordered documents. On these developments one writer has said:
The non-disclosure statutes are objectionable. They are not designed as norms of
conduct for intrinsically condemnable conduct, but are used instead to thwart the
foreign administration of justice and as levers in commercial competition between
nations. Coercing the waiver of these laws by applying the Societi rule is also
objectionable, since it puts the United States courts in the position of selecting
which foreign laws they will ignore, or more precisely, which United States policies have primacy over which foreign values.
Note, supra note 54, at 770; see also Onkelinx, Conflict of InternatzinalJurisdicton."Ordering Production
of Documents in Violation of Law of Sils, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 487 (1969).
58 Note, supra note 19, at 68.
59 [1956] 1 Q.B. 618.
60 Re Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp. et al., 5 D.L.R.(2d) 424 (1956); see Note,
supra note' 19, at 63.
61 [1956] 1 Q.B. 649.
62 For a discussion and analysis of the case, see Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium
Market and The Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 119 (1977).
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Westinghouse notified the utility companies with which it had contracted to supply uranium that, in its view, because of this unforeseen
contingency the contracts had become "commercially impracticable"
and thus unenforceable under section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 63 The utility companies charged Westinghouse with breach of
contract and claimed equitable relief as well as sizable damages. Westinghouse contended that ordinary competitive price fluctuation and normal inflationary factors were not primarily responsible for the great leap
in uranium prices. Rather it maintained that the price of uranium had
been manipulated by the concerted actions of certain foreign governments and producers acting as a cartel to increase the price level artificially. This alleged international uranium cartel included uranium
producers in Australia, South Africa, France, Canada, and Great Britain. Acquiring evidence from these foreign non-resident producers was
therefore crucial to Westinghouse in the development of its defense of
commercial impracticability. Such acquisition, however, proved to be
64
tremendously difficult.
On Westinghouse's application in early 1977, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Richmond issued letters rogatory to the appropriate courts in Canada and the United Kingdom. In
the June 1977 Canadian decision, Re Westinghouse Electric Corporation and
Duquesne Light Company, et al.,65 the court refused to enforce the letters
rogatory. Judge Robins recognized the conventional argument most
often invoked to oppose letters rogatory issued by a foreign court, ie.,
that the letters should be executed only if "it is clear that what is intended is the taking of evidence for the purpose of trial" and not for the
broader purposes of American discovery. 66 The judge quoted Radio Corporation in stating that, "[t]estimony, if it can be called 'testimony,' which
consists of mere answers to questions on the discovery proceeding
designed to lead to a train of questions, is not permissible." '67 To determine precisely which sort of "testimony" the foreign court was seeking,
Judge Robins asserted that he was entitled to go beyond the letters rogatory themselves and examine extrinsic evidence. Unfortunately for Westinghouse, the extrinsic evidence used was a transcript of the Federal
Court proceeding in Richmond in which the presiding judge, Judge
Merhige, stated: "I don't know how relevant the evidence is going to be,
but be that as it may, I have good lawyers here. It may lead to something. '' 68 Consequently, Judge Robins sensed a fishing expedition.
A strict application of the Radio Corporation decision would have
been fatal to Westinghouse from the start, but the Canadian judge re63

U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978).

64 See Note, supra note 19, at 119-21.
65

16 Ont. 2d 273 (H.C. 1977).

66 78 D.L.R.(3d) at 15.
67

Id.

68 Id at 17.
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jected that approach by recognizing that "there is often, if not always, an
element of discovery in examinations conducted pursuant to letters rogatory from a United States Court and their enforcement ought not to be
viewed in too narrow or technical a way." 69 However, Judge Robins
went on to specify a second overriding reason for refusing to execute the
letters rogatory. Quoting liberally from affidavits and public statements,
Judge Robins indicated that as a matter of public policy, the Canadian
government did specifically request and approve of the participation of
Canadian uranium producers in an informal marketing arrangement,
and that in the public interest the court must prohibit the production or
discovery of the documents relating to the marketing of uranium. He
maintained as fundamental that the basis for execution of letters rogatory between the United States and Canada, ie. comity, should not be
applied when to do so would violate the public policy of the requested
state. Furthermore it is not appropriate for a foreign tribunal to determine whether actions taken by or on behalf of the Canadian government
70
violated the laws of that foreign tribunal.
Of utmost importance to Judge Robins were two further developments. First, on the same day the letters rogatory had been issued, Westinghouse had also launched an action in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois against twenty-nine uranium producers, including several that were Canadian, alleging violations of the Sherman
Act and claiming treble damages as relief. Second, the United States
Department of Justice, pursuant to its investigation of possible antitrust
violations by Canadian producers, had empanelled a grand jury in the
District of Columbia which had subpoenaed Westinghouse requiring
production of any documents and testimony obtained during discovery,
notwithstanding the protective orders issued by the federal court in Richmond. Judge Robins explained, "I am not satisfied that the testimony
and documents in this case are really for the purpose of trial or necessary
for the purpose ofjustice. . . .I have become convinced that the principal reason the evidence and productions is being pursued is not for the
'7 1
Richmond hearing."
The case of Re Westinghouse Electric CorporationUranium Contract Litigation 72 came before the British House of Lords at a time when the letters
rogatory issued by the federal district court had already been denied by
Australia, Canada, France and South Africa. Evidently, in those countries "regulations had been passed so as to forbid the documents of the
cartel being disclosed." '73 The case appeared as though it might be the
last chance for Westinghouse to obtain the information it needed for its
commercial impracticability defense.
69 Id at 19.
70 Id at 21-22.
71 Id at 19.

72 [1977] 3 All E.R. 703.
73 Id at 707.
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The letters rogatory in this instance requested documents and testimony from the Rio Tinto Zinc Company, an English company, and its
principal directors. The Court of Appeal decision 74 followed a strictly
formal, literal analysis of the letters rogatory without reference to extraterritorial application of foreign laws or national sovereignty. The British Court of Appeal avoided application of the Radio Corporation test on
two grounds. First, Judge Merhige of the federal district court, possibly
in response to his experience with the Ontario Court, had in this case
supplemented the letters rogatory with a clear statement that the documents were needed, not for pre-trial discovery, but for use at the trial
itself. Lords Denning, Roskill and Shaw of the Court of Appeal felt no
need to look for more extrinsic evidence that the information sought was
for use at trial. Second, the Court of Appeal noted that the Foreign
Tribunals Evidence Act of 1856, upon which the Radio Corporation case
was based, had been replaced by the Evidence Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions Act of 1975, and that the 1975 Act had been passed so as to
give effect to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad
in Civil and Commercial Matters and its stated purpose of "facilitating
the transmission and execution of letters of request and to further the
accommodation of the different methods that nations use for this purpose." The United States had also ratified this Convention; thus the
Convention's terms were applicable to this transaction. The Court of
Appeal looked to the liberal spirit of the Hague Convention for its interpretation, rather than referring back to "a line of judicial decisions, albeit of high authority, under a statute in different terms passed in
'75
different circumstances about 125 years ago."
However, one premise upon which the British Court of Appeal
based its analysis was clearly erroneous. Article 23 of the Hague Convention permits a contracting state, at time of ratification, to declare that it
will not execute letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery. Although the United Kingdom had made such a declaration at the time of ratification, the Court of Appeal specifically based
its findings on the assumption that the United Kingdom had not taken
advantage of Article 23.76
The Court of Appeal opinion also discussed the argument for "privilege" made by counsel for the individual witnesses,- although such discussion was only a preliminary view requested by the parties-no official
claim of privilege had been made. British law does allow a person to
refuse to answer any question in a legal proceeding if in so doing he
would be exposed to criminal proceedings or be subject to penalties provided by law. This would have presented no difficulty under the old law
74 Id

75 Id at 713. Lord Roskill added, "We move in 1975 in a very different world from that of

1856."
76

Id at 709.
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of England, which provided for no relevant penalties. But as Lord Denning stated, "[since] 1972 everything is different. We are now in the European Economic Community. The EEC Treaty and all its provisions
are now a part of the law of England . . . ,,77 And the witnesses, if
forced to testify, could well be found to have breached Article 85 of the
Treaty of Rome and thus be subject to the penalties imposed by General
Regulation 17 of February 6, 1972.78 The Court of Appeal recognized as
a preliminary view that if a privilege were actually claimed it could well
79
defeat enforcement of the letters rogatory.
Both parties appealed the decision to the House of Lords to discover
if the Radio Corporation case would be effectively repudiated and, if so,
what obstacles to letters rogatory would remain. Lord Wilberforce, writing for the Lords, stated that:
the Court of Appeal, while correctly stating that the 1975 Act was a new
Act, may have been led to treat it as dealing more liberally than its
predecessor with pre-trial discovery. I do not so regard
80 the Act; on the

contrary, it appears to me that it takes a stricter line.
The Radio Corporationcase was still effective precedent. Wilberforce also
refused to accept at face value Judge Merhige's contention in the letter
that the evidence was sought solely for trial, recognizing that the letter
was drafted after "consultation with eminent counsel from England"
with the Radio Corporaton case in mind. Lords Fraser, Keith and Viscount Dilhorne all supported Lord Wilberforce on these points. Lord
Diplock, however, disagreed with his colleagues in a well-reasoned opinion:
I would not be inclined to place any narrow interpretation on the phrase
in the Evidence Act of 1975 'evidence . . .to be obtained for the purposes of civil proceedings. . . .' The English court cannot be expected
to know the systems of civil procedure of all countries from which requests for an order under the 1975 Act may come. It has to be satisfied
that the evidence is required for the purposes of civil proceedings in the
requesting court but, in the ordinary way in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, it should, in my view, be prepared to accept the statement
by the requesting court that such' is the purpose for which evidence is
required.8a
However, it was clear to the lords that the Court of Appeal had erred
with regard to the United Kingdom's obligations under the Hague Convention. The House of Lords could have reversed the Court of Appeal
decision on this basis and accordingly denied the American request for
evidence without further explanation. But each lord chose instead to
devote a large part of his opinion to a discussion of the acts and motives
of the United States Government in regard to this proceeding.
Lord Wilberforce noted three considerations regarding how the sov77 Id
78

at 711.

Id at 712.

79 Id at 713.
80 [1978] 1 All. E.R. at 442.
81 Id at 461-62.
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ereignty of the United Kingdom might be prejudiced if the letters rogatory were executed in this instance:
(a) Her Majesty's Government considers that the wide investigatory
procedures under the United States anti-trust legislation against persons
outside the United States who are not United States citizens constitutes

an infringement of the proper jurisdiction and sovereignty of the United
Kingdom.
(b) That the American grand jury in the District of Columbia have
issued a subpoena to Westinghouse requiring that company to produce
to the grand jury documents and testimony obtained in discovery in the

Virginia proceedings. Therefore evidence given in pursuance of the letters rogatory will be available to the United States Government for use
against a United Kingdom company and United Kingdom nationals in
relation to activities occurring outside the United States territory in antitrust proceedings of a penal character.
(c) That the intervention of the United States Government followed by
the grant of the order of immunity of 18 July 1977 shows that the execution of the letters rogatory is being sought for the purposes of the exercise
by United States courts of extra-territorial jurisdiction in penal matters
which in the view of Her Majesty's 82Government is prejudicial to the
sovereignty of the United Kingdom.

This last paragraph refers to the fact that, despite the stated policy of the
U.S. Department of justice that immunity would not be granted to a
witness in private litigation, the Department did grant immunity to the
Rio Tinto witnesses, causing judge Merhige to withdraw his previous
ruling that these witnesses were protected from testifying by the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution. In a formal communication delivered to the State Department, British officials voiced their concern over this attempt by the Department of justice to obtain evidence
for a criminal antitrust investigation by intervening in a civil suit. The
British stressed the importance of settled procedures as protection for the
rights of individuals and expressed the "strong hope that the Department
of Justice will desist from its attempts to undermine these procedures and
discontinue its intervention .. "83
Lord Wilberforce believed that such action by the Department of
justice resulted from extraordinary circumstances relating to the public
interest and policy of the United States, rather than directly from the
civil proceedings in Richmond. He concluded that:
[I]f public interest enters into this matter on one side, so it must be taken
account of on the other; and as the views of the executive in the United
States of America impel the making of the order, so must the views of

the executive in the United Kingdom be considered when it is a question
of implementing orders here. It is axiomatic that in anti-trust matters

the policy of one
state may be to defend what it is the policy of another
84
state to attack.

The letters rogatory requested by Westinghouse in this litigation
were thus never consummated because of their prejudicial effect on the
82
83

Id at 448.
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sovereignty of the United Kingdom, as well as for their technical insufficiency under prevailing British standards.
Taken together these three cases illustrate the various hurdles in the
path of both the procedure for letters rogatory in particular and international judicial assistance in general. When the larger national policy issues involving questions of jurisdiction and conflicts of law are answered,
as in the Lockheed case, most nations favor the less restrictive procedural
requirements for letters rogatory. Indeed it is significant that the Lockheed case can be considered representative of this general trend, for as
late as 1965 the United States was still regarded as "somewhat behind
the other countries in rendering judicial assistance honoring letters rogatory."8 5 The great increase in international transactions which has occurred and is still occurring will supply the impetus to continue this
trend.
The Canadian and British cases on the other hand illustrate the use
of judicial roadblocks thwarting the execution of letters rogatory in order
to avoid the extraterritorial application of another nation's laws. As was
shown in these cases, when the courts of a foreign nation are relied upon
to respond to unilateral attempts at regulation of multinational corporations, the results are often "undignified international altercations between nations professing adherence to a system of law and mutual
respect for each other's laws and legal institutions."8' 6 The legal fictions
and frictions that develop when a nation's judiciary takes responsibility
for decisions directly affecting the nation's foreign policy in this way seriously impede international judicial assistance and such innovations as
the Hague ConventiQn on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters. Clearly the ultimate solution is for the executive
or legislative branches of all countries to join together and resolve jurisdictional conflicts of law problems, instead of beginning with collateral
issues like letters rogatory.8 7 However, the bilateral and multilateral
agreements envisioned here which would regulate multinationals in
place of unilateral regulation are probably not a viable alternative in the
near future. At least for now, only the courts offer hope of "curbing the
anarchical extension of jurisdictional claims. Only the courts provide a
means for giving proper weight on the scales of justice to principles of
international order."8 8
-THOMAS
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